The crisis since August 2007 provides an opportunity to observe the workings of good governance institutions under an extreme stress test and in radically different political settings. Institutions such as independent central banks, fiscal rules and regulatory oversight of public finances were meant to depoliticize macroeconomic stabilization. The comparison of crisis management in the United States and in the European Union shows that the amount of fiscal stimulus and monetary easing engineered is surprisingly similar. Yet good governance institutions are in crisis in the US while it has been a good crisis for governance in the EU (until the Greek turmoil). To interpret this as politicization of macroeconomic policy in the US and successful depoliticization in the EU is misleading, however. The boundaries between economic stabilization and distributive politics have been wiped out in the US exactly because the authorities prioritized economic stabilization. In the EU, the boundaries as drawn are inimical to joint stabilization efforts but this is exactly why they are politically self-enforcing, even though they are economically costly. They are not the embodiment of economic rationality that their proponents once thought.
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Good Governance in Crisis or a Good
Crisis for Governance?
A Comparison of the EU and the US
Introduction
The financial and economic crisis since August 2007 confronted policymakers with unprecedented challenges. European governments were seen by most observers as responding too timidly. An obsession with institutions of good macroeconomic governance, such as fiscal rules and the separation of monetary from fiscal authority, seemed to contribute to inertia in Europe, as the chief economist of the IMF among others alleged (Blanchard 2009; cf Krugman 2009 , Wyplosz 2009 ). In this view, the EU compared badly with the US government under President Obama which was congratulated for its bold fiscal response, tightly coordinated with monetary policy.
Two prominent economists concluded that sacrosanct institutions like central bank independence or fiscal rules have to be abandoned if governments are to stabilize effectively (Buiter 2009; De Grauwe 2009) . However, until early 2010 the EU response has proven to be politically robust despite the alleged functional flaws while the response in the US has come under serious political attack in Congress.
The jury on the effectiveness of each response is still out and will be out for years to come. At this stage, the comparison of the responses in the EU and the US provides us with an opportunity to study how major institutions of 'good governance' actually worked in contrast to how they were meant to work, in different political settings and under the stress test of the Great Recession. After the breakdown of the early post-war consensus about activist, fiscal policy-led stabilization, economists justified institutions like fiscal rules, independent central banks and regulatory oversight as attempts to 'depoliticize' macroeconomic stabilization. They would isolate in particular monetary policy against the influence of electoral or distributive politics (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983) . Like other manifestations of the 'regulatory state' (Pildes and Sunstein 1995, Majone 1996) , these institutions could be justified as correctives to shortcomings of representative democracy that tends to ignore the outsiders of current electoral politics, such as neighboring countries or future generations. Institutions of good governance would bring economic rationality to stabilization, a realm of policymaking that should not be ruled by distributive concerns. 1 Not all of these institutions were new as such; eg the Fed was already an independent central bank. But they were justified on new grounds. The idea was to tie governments' hands, delegate macroeconomic policies as much as possible to independent, non-majoritarian agencies or let rules govern macroeconomic stabilization.
In Schelkle (2005 Schelkle ( , 2006 , I criticized the disciplinarian approach to macroeconomic policy that results from this approach in EU policymaking. In this paper, the crisis of
2007-09 is used as a natural experiment, to analyze the operation of what were
supposed to be economically sound and effective institutions, and assess their success according to the criteria of their proponents. The main findings are that the two good governance regimes delivered a surprisingly similar amount of stabilization in the first round of crisis management although the institutions of regulatory oversight, fiscal rules, and independent central banks fared rather differently. In the US, central bank independence was temporarily suspended and regulatory oversight became less visible while both were conspicuous and even reinforced in the EU. By contrast, fiscal rules on state budgets were observed in the US but suspended in the EU. This paper advances an analysis of the difference in terms of contestation over the boundaries between macroeconomic stabilization and distributive politics. Paradoxically and contrary to what the philosophy of good governance states, prioritizing economic stability in a crisis meant that US authorities had to ignore the boundaries drawn by these institutions while member states in the EU insisted on respecting them for political reasons, even though this was economically destabilizing.
In the next section, I summarize how the consensus on good governance was implemented in the EU and the US. The following section will show how different the responses in the EU and the US were, but also that the amounts of fiscal stimulus and monetary easing are not as different as the difference in policy inputs leads one to expect. The final section explains that the rationale of good economic governance institutions is political.
Good governance innovations in the EU and the US
The institutions analysed here originated in the experience of the 1970s when capitalist democracies came to be seen as suffering from inherent deficit and inflation biases. The building blocks of the emerging paradigm were independent central banks, transparently and actively pursuing inflation control, and fiscal policy constrained either by policy rules or independent agencies of oversight that prevent political business cycles, policy surprises and pork-barrel politics. Since microeconomic incentives would work in a predictable policy environment, macroprudential supervision of the financial system -in contrast to risk regulation of individual institutions --was seen as largely superfluous (Brunnermeier et al 2009: 10) .
The introduction of fiscal rules and independent central banks were novelties in Europe, closely related to the project of creating an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), comprising an internal market among all EU members and a common currency for some. In the US, the 1980s also saw some institutional reform: a balanced budget rule for the federal government was introduced for the first time, the Federal Reserve Bank asserted its independence through money supply control and regulatory agencies for federal programmes were established. Some observers conceived this as regulatory state building, the emergence of a 'fourth branch of government' on both sides of the Atlantic, despite rather different political settings. Majone (1993 Majone ( , 1996 interpreted the EU as a regulatory state in the sense that the Commission acts legitimately as an independent trustee of national democracies, specifically to enhance the credibility of governments' commitment to open markets.
The commitment to price stability can now be recognized as part of this movement, ensured either by 'rules rather than discretion' (Kydland and Prescott 1977) or delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks (Barro and Gordon 1983 ). Majone's interpretation draws on the US experience, although the regulatory state there has been the result of a power political struggle between the Presidency and Congress. Presidents successively gained control rights over the federal bureaucracy from the legislature and established a 'managerial presidency' (Pildes and Sunstein 1995: 11-15) . The Fed's new emphasis on price stability under Chairman Volcker since 1979 was a separate institutional development but had a similar goal, namely to make economic norms of stability and efficiency trump considerations of political expediency. The different constitutional background gives us the comparative variation to assess how similar institutional innovations work in practice and under rather extreme circumstances. Three innovations and their actual working will be compared: agencies for fiscal oversight, fiscal rules and independent central banks.
Regulatory agencies for fiscal oversight
Delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies became popular with the wave of deregulation and privatisation of public utilities in the 1980s and '90s (Pildes and Sunstein 1995: 3) . These regulatory bodies, 'outside the line of hierarchical control or oversight by the departments of central government' (Majone 1996: 15) , were seen as an alternative to public ownership or political control by ministerial bureaucracies. We can see the European Commission and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in this light, namely as regulators of budgets whose decisions can only be challenged by judicial review or, informally, by noncompliance.
All EU members are subject to fiscal surveillance, in the form of an annual cycle of peer review that assesses whether they comply with the major stipulations of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), such as having a deficit that does not normally exceed three per cent of GDP. The only difference between euro area members and other EU-members is that the latter cannot be fined under the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The authority for EU fiscal surveillance is split between the selfregulatory ECOFIN Council, (Savage 2005: 62; 192) . If a member state refuses to comply by new accounting rules, Eurostat can decline certification of its reports which constitutes a breach of the Maastricht Treaty and can trigger an EDP -for which the cases of Portugal and France are precedents (Savage 2005: 149) .
The powers of general inspection that DG Ecfin and Eurostat wield with respect to the budgets of EU member states exceed anything that the federal government in the US can exercise over the states (Sbragia 2004: 59) . There is no US equivalent to the annual Convergence or Stability Programmes that ministries of finance in the EU have to submit annually. Fiscal oversight of states' use of funds is strictly tied to budgetary flows, i.e. the federal administration can attach strings only to transfer programmes by which it is funding states. While the EU does this as well, say for regional aid, this kind of control is more important in the US because federal grants cover a third of all state and local expenditure (Blöndal et al 2003: 52) , amounting to about 3 per cent of US GDP. The strings attached to federal grants are controlled by the mighty appropriations committees of Congress and the powerful Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The director of OMB is a ministerial level position and a member of the President's Cabinet. For the budgetary process, this independent agency in the presidential administration assumes the policy-making functions that in most countries are assigned to the Treasury. In normal times, the US Treasury is concerned with the daily cash management of the federal government and plays a secondary role for policymaking, given that the Council of Economic Advisors is also part of the Executive Office of the President (Blöndal et al 2003: 14, 47 ).
In budgeting, 'the President and the Congress "co-manage" the executive branch.' (Blöndal et al 2003: 39; cf Pildes and Sunstein 1995: 11-16 ) Once the budget is passed, the OMB monitors the compliance with rules at the programme and agency level.
Congressional appropriations bills are more detailed and extensive than in any other OECD country, since Congress 'often dictates specific management decisions' (Blöndal et al 2003: 25) . Hence, because fiscal transfers provide the entry point for oversight, the US federal government ends up regulating particular expenditures but not the fiscal envelope of the states.
The EU lacks controls over particular budget items, except if they raise specific issues of market integration. State aid rules are an important source of expenditure control.
EU rules prescribe that both public procurement and subsidies to firms or sectors must observe strict non-discrimination between nationals and firms from other EU countries. These rules grant a number of exemptions (Art.87, s.2 and 3), e.g. for aid with 'a social character' to individuals, for promoting economic development or any objective that the Council has deemed worthy, as long as this aid is given on a nondiscriminatory basis and does not affect trade unduly. While this is often portrayed as providing loopholes for continuing an inefficient practice, the Commission and the Court have achieved a remarkable streamlining of state aid policies in member states (Blauberger 2009 ). The 'state aid problem' is partitioned into one that is concerned with efficiency (safeguarding competition), subject to EU regulation, and another concerned with legitimate redistributive objectives, left to member states.
This draws a line in the sand between economic and political objectives with which governments have learnt to live.
In the US, the oversight over state aid is left to courts. Ever since the 19 th century, the Supreme Court has established the so-called 'Dormant Commerce Clause' in case law prohibiting discriminatory and protectionist regulation by a state in favour of the economic interests of its citizens (Redlich et al 2005: ch.5 ). This body of case law applies in areas that are not explicitly covered by the Commerce Clause which gives the federal government the power to regulate all areas relevant to interstate commerce. But there is an important exception to this Dormant Commerce Clause: the 'market participant exception' says that a state may favour its own residents when it acts as a seller or buyer of goods and services, rather than as a market regulator. Regan (1986 Regan ( : 1193 Regan ( -1195 ) advances a rationale for this exception. Protection and discrimination seems to be allowed, first, whenever the state does not use traditional protectionist instruments, such as a tariff; and, second, when the intervention involves spending of the states' own funds. Spending is less coercive than regulation and taxation, and is inherently limited by the budget constraint. Case law has thus allowed states to buy only from local providers, waive taxes (i.e. forego revenue) on new manufacturers locating in the state and require firms to hire only local workers for state-funded building works. Thus, the use of state expenditures to support employment or bail out firms is less tightly regulated in the US than the EU.
Fiscal rules
Another way of dealing with a deficit bias of governments has been the instrument of numerical rules, complementing or substituting for independent agencies (Wyplosz 2005) . Fiscal rules in the guise of balanced budget or Golden Rules are nothing new but the good governance literature has explained them in terms of their contribution to dynamic consistency and 'depoliticisation' of budgetary policy (Kopits and Symanski 1998; European Commission 2006: 129-132) . To the extent that stabilization is necessary at all, it should be left to automatic stabilizers, notably income taxes and unemployment benefits, which make for a counter-cyclical variation of the budget balance and support credit-constrained households directly.
Discretionary budgetary interventions are seen as prone to privileging some sectors, such as construction or public services, which distorts the allocation of resources beyond the recession (ECB 2009: 77-78) .
The fiscal rules of the SGP require governments specifically to avoid an 'excessive' deficit already mentioned, avoid debt of more than sixty per cent of GDP and have a budget 'close to balance or in surplus' over the business cycle. All rules are meant to avoid (a dynamic towards) high public debt since this would put pressure on monetary policy, as the Council conclusions establishing the SGP explicitly stated (Council 1996: para.18 ). The Pact was revised in 2005. Governments can now invoke exemptions from the deficit rule like systemic pension reforms or a sustained period of low -not, as previously, negative --growth which allow postponement of steps towards being fined under the EDP.
Enforcement is a weakness of supranational and national rules in the EU alike. 2 Obviously, there is a debate on whether these rules are just 'smokescreens' (Debrun and Kumar 2007) and provide incentives for 'fiscal gimmickry' (Von Hagen and Wolf 2004) . They are all self-imposed by sovereign actors, the ECOFIN Council in the EU, government agencies in member states (Wierts 2008: table 6.1, 256) . But these slack enforcement mechanisms may not be an accident, given the absence of a stabilizing federal budget. The EU budget is not only small (about one per cent of EU GDP), it also has to be balanced annually. Thus even if it were bigger, the Community budget cannot vary with the business cycle. The sub-federal units (the member states) have effectively denied it a stabilizing role.
The use of fiscal rules is an apparent similarity between the EU and the US. Virtually all US states have balanced budget rules for a long time (NASBO 2008: table 11).
They apply annually and relate to the operational budget only, i.e. to current revenue and expenditures. Capital outlays for multi-year public investments may be debtfinanced but then debt or debt service limits apply (NASBO 2008: table 12) . There is typically no spending without appropriation by state legislatures. But these rules were in place before the current onset of good governance. Only the fiscal rule at the federal level, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act introduced in 1985, can be seen as an innovation inspired by 'depoliticizing' budget restraint. Yet, it did not achieve its aim of a federal balanced budget by 1991 and was replaced, first by the Budget Enforcement Act in 1990 and then the Balanced Budget Act in 1997. Since the federal budget went into surplus since 1999, the constraints on new programmes were circumvented and the Act expired in 2002. All three Acts for a federal rule were parliamentary initiatives (Savage and Verdun 2007: 847-857) .
How come that relatively good compliance with balanced budget rules has been found for many US states (Bohn and Inman 1996) while the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act failed to constrain the federal budget? The states' prudence is greatly facilitated by the opportunity of letting the federal government run the deficits when recession strikes. The federal government regularly grants disaster relief and temporary fiscal aid in times of economic downturns to states (GAO 2004) . The budget stabilization funds that virtually all states maintain are often quite limited, for instance capped to not exceed 10 per cent of current revenue, and hence not able to smooth spending in a prolonged recession (NASBO 2008: table 19, 50) . The uses that can be made of temporary fiscal aid are not prescribed. Aid is allocated on the basis of population size, not on the basis of fiscal need or capacity. Not only does this create windfall gains for some states, it also leads to moral hazard in that state governments do not build up sufficient rainy day funds of their own (GAO 2004: 5) .
The prudence of state budgets thus depends on a stabilizing federal budget which has been allowed to renege on complying with a balanced budget rule. This is the exact opposite of the EU where member states cannot rely on another tier to do the stabilization for them and therefore must be allowed to run deficits.
Independent central banks
Until 1989, only the US, Germany and Switzerland had legally independent central banks (Lastra 1996: 9) The preceding section can be summarized in table 1 which also contains my judgment of how strong the respective dimensions are in comparison. While not too much weight should be placed on any single classification as weak or strong, it is striking that the two economic governance regimes differ, perhaps not surprisingly, in every dimension and yet the overall score is fairly similar. This was the starting point for the comparison between apparently idiosyncratic cases -there is plenty of variation within a shared post-Golden Age consensus that good economic governance requires non-majoritarian institutions which depoliticize macroeconomic stabilization. 
Fiscal responses
In the beginning, the effectiveness of governments was measured in how big a stimulus package they could put together at short notice. The US won hands-down on this media account, an impression created by bank bailouts of truly astonishing
proportions. However, they may do little for stimulating demand and employment.
Bank bailouts served to maintain the solvency of banks but hardly managed to expand new credit to firms and households. Banks kept reserves and central bank credit on their balances or reduced more expensive debt vis-à-vis other creditors ('deleveraging'). And monetary tightening will set in as soon as credit expansion began to revive.
To start with discretionary fiscal interventions: The US federal government was first recapitalisation measures for the financial sector because these ('below-the-line') budget operations have an uncertain and at best indirect effect on demand, as outlined above. Note: 'The figures have been corrected for: (i) "below-the-line" operations that do not impact the fiscal balance; and (ii) the fact that in some countries part of the announced stimulus included measures that were already planned for. ' (IMF 2009: 13; similarly OECD 2009: 60) What is noteworthy about the figures for Europe is the diversity of responses, contradicting the view that the fiscal framework imposes a one-size-fits-all policy. It also shows that rhetoric is typically the opposite of action: while the German government has been vocal about the need for fiscal restraint, it decided on one of the larger discretionary packages, while France and the UK, urging their European neighbours to go for large interventions, stimulated much less. The UK was hampered by fiscal overstretch due to massive bank bailouts while the discrepancy between rhetoric and action in the French position indicates a wait-and-see attitude which was alleged to mark the EU's response to the crisis (Krugman 2009 ).
Observing Germany's hypocrisy and Spain's decisiveness suggests, however, that this does not apply across the board.
In the US, about half of the projected shortfalls of state budgets, to the tune of $250 billion through 2011, are covered by $135 billion federal grants and distributed on the basis of existing formulas (Scheppach 2009 
Revenue measures
Corporate tax reduction/ depreciation P P/T P Personal income tax reduction T P P P P Indirect tax reduction (VAT etc) P S S Other P Source: IMF (2009 : Table 5) T: Temporary measures (with explicit sunset provisions or time-bound spending) S: Self-reversing measures (costs of which will be recouped by compensatory measures in future years) P: Permanent measures (with recurrent fiscal costs)
How much did automatic stabilizers contribute, i.e. revenue and expenditure items (such as income taxes or unemployment benefits) that make budget balances vary counter-cyclically with booms and recessions even if the government does not take any discretionary action? Table 4 gives the contribution of automatic stabilization, based on the latest OECD measures for budget elasticities which do not change much over time (Girouard and General government expenditure in the US is about thirty per cent of GDP, two thirds of which by the federal goverment (Blöndal et al 2003: 52) , below the OECD average of over forty per cent. The stabilizing effect of the US federal budget is partly undone by the pro-cyclical effect of state and local fiscal policies (Follette et al. 2008) .
By contrast, the EU budget balance does not contribute anything; it is too small and does not vary with the business cycle.
Tables 2-4 suggest that the US and the EU are not that different as regards the policy output of overall fiscal stabilization and the concrete steps taken. Adding up the fiscal contribution to aggregate demand as calculated in tables 2 and 4 shows that the estimated US stimulus over three years (8.5 per cent of GDP) is not much higher than the UK's (6.8 per cent), similar to Germany's (8.1 per cent), and lower than Spain's (11.1 per cent). Most of the differences are accounted for by differences in the evolving output gaps. This is contrary to what most commentators suggest. The impression was created because the US intervention was much more visible in bank bailouts and the drama of stimulus packaging played out in Congress. European countries relied more on automatic stabilizers or downplayed the extent of their discretionary intervention in the case of Germany.
Relying on automatic stabilization in the member states spared EU governments the political drama in the Council of having to agree on joined, yet tailored fiscal action for a heterogeneous union with diverse needs and capacities, in the spotlight of national media which would closely watch how the costs are shared. The reliance on automatic stabilizers can be justified on the same grounds as other good governance institutions although it usually is not (Mabbett and Schelkle 2007: 87-88) . Thus, the different mix of discretionary and automatic measures in the fiscal stimulus of the US and the EU is evidence for the Europeans relying more on good governance institutions -not because they are inherently more attracted by these principles but because these institutions compensate to some extent for the unwillingness or inability to coordinate their policies in the absence of centralised fiscal authority. Reserve credit started from a lower base as a share of GDP but then increased dramatically. The refinancing of banks was the same in relative terms in the US and in EMU until the Lehman collapse, but again rose more dramatically in the US after that. The comparison of the two measures of central bank credit to the economy also reveals that euro area bank credit did not shrink as much as US commercial bank credit; hence ECB credit as a share of GDP is still higher than in the US while it does not reach the same proportions relative to euro area bank credit.
Monetary responses
Graph 1a
Central bank credit as share of GDP The quality of assets has deteriorated in both banks' balance sheets although the default risk is considerably higher for the Fed. Moreover, the Fed holds now direct claims against the non-bank private sector, like a commercial bank, and Treasury bonds that it acquired in the direct monetization of public debt, like a dependent central bank. The ECB, by contrast, has refrained from either. Commercial banking can lead to large losses and even insolvency that would force the ECB to go cap in hand to the Council, leading to controversy about how to split the cost of a central bank bailout. 13 Direct lending to Treasuries would raise issues of distribution: should the ECB lend to members with an unsustainable deficit because they need it most or to members whose public finances are least in need of a cheap source of Euro supply? The anticipated responses of financial markets would split the Council to breaking point. In sum, while presumably both the Fed and the ECB have an institutional self-interest in keeping their independent status, only the Fed has taken the risk in order to fight the crisis. The ECB would have to take into account that such behaviour could call the very basis of the currency union into question, with no more common currency to manage after the dust has settled.
Regulatory responses
The role of regulatory oversight in fiscal crisis management is, at first sight, predictably different in the EU and the US. What is perhaps less predictable is that the Commission does not relent in its regulation of budgets while the federal government in the US, despite its huge fiscal leverage, exercises rather lenient oversight over the spending of its funds in the states.
The Commission keeps on recommending the opening of excessive deficit procedures, for instance as early as March 2009, against Euro area members which had structural -not cyclical --deficits above three per cent of national GDP in 2008 already (France, Greece, Ireland, and Spain). The press statement 14 stresses that member states 'rightly adopted' discretionary measures but that the SGP should be seen as a framework for an 'exit strategy' from rapidly increasing debt burdens. The
Commission has reiterated this message continuously, so as to justify why the exemption clause --no EDP against a country with low or negative growth rates -is not invoked instead. Recommending an EDP puts the issue on the agenda of the Ecofin Council. It must then come up with reasons why it is not following the recommendation of the Commission and the deficit country must outline a strategy to get back to normal.
The contrast with the US is stark. Against the backdrop of projected budget deficits in the two digits for 2009 and 2010, the Obama administration still puts its emphasis on the accountability to the current taxpayer rather than the burden on future taxpayers: 'The President has made it clear that every taxpayer dollar spent on our economic recovery must be subject to unprecedented levels of transparency and 14 IP /09/458 accountability'. 15 To be sure, there is great unease among independent and conservative voters, from which the Republican opposition benefits, to the point where it jeopardizes health care reform. But the state finances are in such dire straits that there is little opposition raised by state legislatures. 16 Figure 2 shows the evolution of budget deficits in the form of cash balances unadjusted for cyclical effects. This is how parliaments (and concerned voters) see budgets, namely including public resources that went into bank bailouts to prop up their reserves as well as the net spending triggered by automatic stabilizers, although it is not really an economically 'correct' view of the stimulus, which is shown by tables 1 and 3.
Graph 2
General The Commission was bolstered by the outrage that the Opel deal triggered in other member states, above all in Belgium, Spain and the UK.
In the US, the initial guidelines of the stimulus plan do not contain an explicit prohibition of states' discriminatory use of federal grants by the regulator, the OMB.
There is no reference to 'protection' or to 'discrimination' with reference to states (OMB 2009: para.1.6 To put it somewhat simplistically, good governance is in crisis in the US -fiscal discretion on a massive scale took the lead, with monetary policy acting as the 'offbudget, off-balance-sheet and off-the-Congressional-radar-screen' (Buiter 2009 After all, the concentration and dominance of fiscal authority put all politics under the imperative of economic stabilization. The exact opposite to politicization, namely the economization of politics as we know it, would be an equally valid characterization. What seems therefore a more plausible description is that the tsunami of this crisis wiped out the lines in the sand that good governance institutions try to draw between macroeconomic stabilization and distributive politics. It could do so because major forces, political at the state level and economic in the financial sector, decided not to erect many defenses. It was the only way to square the circle of a collapse in revenues and balanced budget rules. They exploited the fact that the federal government's hands were forced by the unfolding events, From the point of view of governance, it is a paradox of the weakness of strength.
But why did good governance institutions prove to be so robust in the EU, against the odds? Most observers predicted renationalization and a general meltdown of 20 But the pervasive and severe character of this crisis was a blessing in disguise for cooperation in that it concentrated governments' minds, made them concede that nationalism had to be reined in and appreciate the insurance inherent in a stable common currency. Members accepted shared sovereignty over emergency measures for the national economy, as long as they did not require any permanent institutional changes such as joint fiscal policy or giving the ECB decisive powers as a financial supervisor. Due to the weakness of the EU as a polity and the dominance of domestic politics, leaders cling to established institutions which preserve the boundaries between economic stabilization and distributive politics. However, the boundaries as drawn, namely to assign political responsibility to the member states and economic rationality to the EU level, are dysfunctional for joint fiscal stabilization efforts.
The Greek turmoil since December 2009 is beyond the time horizon of this paper, but readers may well ask whether it does not prove that the EU's good governance institutions have become obsolete. To me, it rather shows how strong political preferences for the status quo are. In a Postscript at the end of this paper, I go through the significant changes and reform proposals to support my case.
Hence, we may conclude that, in order to stabilize effectively, the US had to suspend the good governance principles of refraining from fiscal activism, ensuring the material independence of the central bank from the Treasury, and exercising budgetary oversight under the norm of economic efficiency. At the EU level, by contrast, good governance institutions have proven their political value to governments throughout this crisis, especially since the lack of joined-up stabilization efforts has not hindered reasonably effective crisis management domestically. Good governance institutions still have their political uses, especially in such weak polities as the EU. But they are not the embodiment of economic rationality that their proponents once thought.
Postscript: The Greek crisis and good governance
In this section, written in May 2010, I do not intend to give a full account of the Greek crisis but address the sensible objection that it was not such a good crisis for EU governance after all. The main protagonists in this drama, be it ECB President
Trichet, Eurogroup President Junker or Chancellor Merkel, would certainly support this objection. However, I argue that the crisis highlights the features of the existing framework that make it politically so attractive and economically so costly. And the imminent or proposed reforms do not fundamentally change these features but try to amend them incrementally.
There is first the heavy reliance of crisis management on monetary policy, or more precisely: on the ECB as the one European actor with an effective macropolicy. The
Greek turmoil was partly triggered when the ECB President signaled its exit strategy, namely that its 'unorthodox' measure of accepting bonds with BBB-rating would be phased out in 2010. This raised the prospect that Greek bonds which had just been downgraded would become ineligible for banks' refinancing operations with the ECB, so banks started to sell them. The ECB then reversed its plans with astonishingly specific reference to Greece: 'The Eurosystem's credit quality threshold
shall not apply to marketable debt instruments issued by the Greek Government.'
(ECB 2010a) The ECB thus bailed out commercial banks which had bought Greek bonds and then used them as collateral when borrowing from the ECB (Tett 2010) .
Four days later, the ECB had to announce that it would directly buy public and private debt instruments, but duly sterilize their impact on money supply. 22 This sequence of events reveals how fragile are the lines in the sand that good governance institutions try to draw between monetary and fiscal policy. And the sequence illustrates that the ECB is another example for the weakness of strength, analogous to the federal fiscal authorities in the US: because there is no other actor who could effectively stabilize, it had to break all its self-inflicted taboos. But at least it has broken the taboos of its own choosing and preserved its independent status for the time being. Governments were forced to accept one innovation, namely credit support for countries in distress that ultimately draws on national budgets. The permanent shape of this credit facility is likely to follow the IMF role model. Hence, it will become another good governance institution with standard procedures and programmes that require political endorsement from governments only at the very end of negotiations between the Fund and a national Treasury. But this innovation does nothing for coordinated macroeconomic stabilization (Mabbett and Schelkle 2010: 83) . The institutional status quo of fiscal good governance is thus well preserved by the lack of support for a political union. In fiscal terms, a political union to back up monetary unification would require a central budget and some degree of joint public debt management. In the absence of democratic approval, the EU relies on the automatic stabilizers built into its welfare states for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 23 The suspension of cohesion funding due to excessive deficits is already possible under Article 126(8) of the Treaty.
